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NAFTA Chapter 11 as Supraconstitution 
 
Stepan Wood and Stephen Clarkson* 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Legal scholars increasingly invoke constitutional concepts and terminology to make sense of the 
remarkable growth of transnational and international legal orders.  They employ constitutional 
terminology in a bewildering variety of ways, often with little effort to clarify their analytical 
frameworks or acknowledge the normative presuppositions embedded in their analysis.  The 
critical potential of constitutional analysis is frequently lost in methodological confusion and 
normative controversy.  An effort at clarification is necessary if constitutional discourse is to 
realize its potential as a critique of power.   
 
We propose a functional approach to international constitutional analysis, centred on the concept 
of a supraconstitution.  A supraconstitution is a constitutional order arising at the international 
level, which at the same time transforms domestic legal orders by embedding an external 
constitution into national ones (Clarkson and Wood 2006, 98). Simultaneously international and 
domestic, it is a quintessentially transnational phenomenon.  Supraconstitutionalization is not an 
“all or nothing” affair (Dunoff and Trachtman 2009b, 9) but a continuum of discourse and 
practice that is simultaneously domestic and transnational, and highly uneven across time, space 
and subject matter.   
 
After setting out our analytical framework in Part 1, we apply it to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)1 in Part 2, concluding that NAFTA’s investment chapter 
superimposes a nascent supraconstitutional legal order on member states' domestic constitutional 
orders.  In Part 3 we highlight several reasons for concern about this emerging supraconstitution.  
Finally, in Part 4, we explain what supraconstitutional analysis offers as an instrument of critique 
that conventional analyses of transnational legal orders do not.   
 
 
 
                                                
* Stepan Wood, Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, swood@osgoode.yorku.ca. 
Stephen Clarkson, Professor of Political Economy, University of Toronto, stephen.clarkson@utoronto.ca 
1 North American Free Trade Agreement (Canada-Mexico-United States), Dec. 17, 1992, Can. T.S. 1994, No. 2, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) (“NAFTA”). 
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II. Supraconstitutionalization: A Framework for Analysis of 
Transnational Legal Orders 
 
There is nothing novel about constitutional analysis of international law and organizations.  Legal 
scholars have engaged sporadically in such analysis for many decades, from the United Nations 
Charter to the European Community, and from international human rights law to international 
trade and investment regimes (Verdross 1926; Lauterpacht 1950, 463; Ross 1950; Opsahl 1961; 
Jackson 1969, 1980; Stein 1981).  It is only in the last decade, however, that such analyses have 
begun to occupy the mainstream of international legal scholarship (Fassbender 1998; Weiler 
1999; De Búrca and Scott 2001; Joerges, Sand and Teubner 2004; Orrego Vicuña 2004; 
MacDonald and Johnston 2005; Cass 2005; Joerges and Petersmann 2006; Dunoff and Trachtman 
2009a).  In relation to Europe, the debate now centers on what kind of constitution the European 
Union ought to have, rather than whether it has one at all (Weiler and Wind 2003; Avbelj 2008).  
  
Many of these commentators employ constitutional terminology in an optimistic way, portraying 
international constitutionalism as a contemporary manifestation of international law’s mandate as 
the “gentle civilizer of nations” (Koskenniemi 2001).  The end of the Cold War seemed to 
reinvigorate this project, inaugurating a burst of international institution-building, driven by 
renewed enthusiasm for international human rights, the rule of law, liberal-democratic reform and 
free market capitalism.  This euphoric mood was not shared by many international legal scholars 
from the developing world, who saw the project of international constitutionalism as part of an 
imperial global state in the making (Chimni 2004).  In any event the euphoria collapsed after 
September 11, 2001, when many international lawyers found themselves invoking international 
constitutionalism not as a triumphal project of international integration but as an anxious defence 
against the perceived threats to the international order posed by the Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive 
self-defence and the hostility toward international law and organizations that characterized the 
American-led global War on Terror.  Constitutionalism was one language in which to challenge 
the legitimacy and legality of these developments. 
 
Constitutionalism is not just an instrument of rule, invoked to bestow legitimacy upon the 
exercise of power.  It also has a long history as a “critique of rule, as a vocabulary of rights, 
accountability and transparency” (Koskenniemi 2005, 17, emphasis in original).  This critical 
potential is inhibited by the conceptual confusion that characterizes contemporary constitutional 
analysis of international law.  Legal scholars apply constitutional concepts and terminology to 
international affairs in a bewildering variety of ways, often with little or no effort to clarify their 
analytical frameworks or acknowledge the normative presuppositions embedded in their analysis 
(Walker 2003, 39).  An effort at clarification is therefore necessary.   
 
We are not the first to make such an effort.  Recent scholarship has brought us some distance 
toward analytical clarity (e.g. Kumm 2004, 2006; Schneiderman 2008, Dunoff & Trachtman 
2009a).  Like the editors of a recent major volume on international constitutionalization, we 
advocate a functional approach to the phenomenon (Dunoff & Trachtman 2009b).  Also like 
them, we believe that clarity is best served by an analytical framework that is agnostic as to the 
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normative desirability of international constitutionalization (ibid., 4), at least in the initial stages 
of analysis.  A functional analysis asks how we are governed, deferring to a later stage of inquiry 
the question of whether these governance arrangements ought to be promoted or resisted.   
 
Unlike Dunoff and Trachtman, however, we do not consider the granting of international law-
making authority to a centralized authority to be the hallmark of international 
constitutionalization.  International constitutionalization is not so much about enabling or 
constraining the production of international law (ibid.) – as if states were not already floating in a 
sea of international law. It is more about the extent to which norms and institutions beyond the 
state transform domestic constitutional orders and constrain domestic law-making.  It is this 
interaction between the international and the domestic that defines international 
constitutionalization.     
 
A constitution is the ensemble of fundamental norms and institutions that perform certain basic 
functions in the establishment and organization of a given polity’s legal order. Such functions 
include establishment of public institutions and political subdivisions, distribution of law-making 
authority among them, determination of objectives to guide the exercise of public authority, 
placement of constraints on their exercise, and judicial review of the exercise of public authority 
(Verdross, 1926; Snyder 2003, 56; Kumm 2006, 508).   
 
We propose the term supraconstitution to refer to those international norms and institutions that 
form part of the assemblage of fundamental practices by which a national society is governed and 
from which domestic laws and policies – including constitutional norms – are not permitted to 
derogate (Clarkson and Wood 2009).  Like constitutions generally, a supraconstitution can be 
analyzed in terms of general principles guiding the allocation and exercise of power, basic rules 
governing members’ behaviour, and fundamental rights of community members vis-à-vis 
governing authorities.  It can also be analyzed in terms of the institutions that perform – to 
varying degrees – legislative, executive, administrative, adjudicative, and enforcement functions.  
As fundamental elements of the legal order, these principles, rules, rights and institutions take 
precedence over ordinary political and legal decision-making, are harder to change than other 
norms and institutions, and are rooted in a particular system of core values (Wiener 2003; 
Bogdandy 2006, 231).   
 
The term constitution is also used in a normative sense to denote the establishment of a legitimate, 
independent authority that structures a political process while legitimising it (Kumm 2006, 509). 
A community may have a constitution in the functional sense without having a constitution in the 
normative sense.  What is considered necessary to establish a constitution in this normative sense 
depends on the variety of constitutionalism to which the observer subscribes.  Constitutionalism 
refers to a normative position advocating constitutionalization (Trachtman 2006, 630), the 
historical process by which constitutions emerge, are consolidated, and expand to fill new 
domains (e.g. Cass 2001, 2005).   
 
While there are many competing varieties of constitutionalism at play in contemporary debates 
about transnational constitutionalization (Avbelj 2008), all are rooted in liberal-democratic 
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political theory.  As such, whether they are used to criticize or celebrate, they emphasize the 
constraint of public power, the rule of law, the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and 
legitimation via democratic deliberation.  Debates about whether this or that supranational entity 
has a constitution in the normative sense are, in effect, debates about whether its fundamental 
norms, practices and institutions, and the procedures by which they are established, conform to 
the observers’ preferred version of constitutionalism.   
 
We do not shy away from this sort of normative inquiry.  On the contrary, the principal attraction 
of our functional analysis is that it strips away some of the conceptual and ideological blinkers 
that prevent us from recognizing fully the fundamental arrangements by which societies are 
governed, and thus opens these arrangements to critical scrutiny.  In Parts 2 and 3 we advance the 
normative claim that existing supraconstitutional norms and practices embodied in the emerging 
international investment arbitration regime are deeply inequitable and undemocratic.  As we 
explain in Part 4, constitutional discourse, which has been almost entirely absent from public 
debates about this regime, provides a powerful instrument for its critique.   
 
 
III. NAFTA Chapter 11 as Supraconstitution: Constraint, Primacy 
and Pre-Commitment  
 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA confers several important rights on investors – which for practical 
purposes means transnational corporations (TNCs)  – from other NAFTA countries: national 
treatment (Article 1102), most favoured nation treatment (Article 1103), fair and equitable 
treatment in accordance with an international minimum standard (Article 1105), freedom from 
performance requirements (Article 1106),2 and freedom from expropriation or measures 
“tantamount to expropriation” (Article 1110).  Article 1110 provides that no NAFTA 
government “may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of 
another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of 
such an investment,” except for a public purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis, in accordance 
with due process of law and minimum standards of treatment, and on payment of compensation.  
“Investment” is defined broadly to include almost any form of business asset, actual or 
anticipated, tangible or intangible.3   
 
NAFTA creates a system of international investment arbitration whereby aggrieved foreign 
investors may challenge host states’ actions that allegedly interfere with their rights. These 
challenges to the exercise of public authority by sovereign states are heard by international 
arbitral panels that operate under rules designed for the settlement of international commercial 
                                                
2 Article 1106 prohibits NAFTA governments from imposing performance requirements as a condition for the 
establishment, operation, management, conduct, or operation of foreign investments, such as export commitments, 
local sourcing, local employment, local research and development investments, or technology transfer.  NAFTA, 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., Art. 1106. 
3 Ibid., Art. 1139. 
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disputes.  Similar rights and remedies are found in hundreds of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs).  The resulting global web of investment rules creates powerful rights for transnational 
capital and a powerful new zone of adjudication to enforce them.   
 
The international investment arbitration regime established by NAFTA and BITs has three 
features normally associated with a constitution: it is intended to constrain the exercise of public 
authority by government actors, it is effective and enforceable in host states’ legal systems even 
in the face of contrary legislation, and it is difficult to change.  We will address each of these 
features in turn. 
 
 
A. NAFTA CONSTRAINS THE EXERCISE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 
 
There is no doubt that the international investment arbitration regime embodied in NAFTA and 
BITs was intended to limit governments’ exercise of public power by giving transnational capital 
enforceable protection against certain forms of state intervention in the economy, including 
protection against expropriation broadly analogous to that conferred by the Fifth Amendment to 
the US Constitution.  Whether these treaties constrain the exercise of public authority in practice 
is more controversial.  TNCs invoke them aggressively to inhibit public welfare regulation, with 
at least some effect.  Even though governments have won most Chapter 11 decisions, arbitral 
panels have taken a broad view of what can count as measures “tantamount to expropriation,” 
effectively restricting governments’ ability to regulate TNCs’ activities in what they see as the 
public interest.   
 
Early Chapter 11 decisions stoked fears that NAFTA would limit governments’ ability to 
regulate transnational capital in the interest of public health and welfare.  The Ethyl case showed 
that investor arbitration claims can intimidate host governments into repealing legislation even 
before a decision is rendered on the merits of the claim. The case dealt with Ottawa’s short-lived 
ban on imports of MMT, a highly toxic gasoline additive and suspected neurotoxin which had 
been used in Canada since 1976 to increase the octane rating of unleaded gasoline and reduce 
engine “knocking” (Michalos 2008, 72).  Acting upon mounting public concern about its harmful 
effects on emission control systems and air pollution, the Canadian government put the ban in 
place even though the scientific evidence of these harms was mixed.  The American 
manufacturer brought a Chapter 11 suit claiming that the ban violated NAFTA.  After losing a 
bid to have the case dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, Canada settled the claim for US $13 
million and rescinded the ban.  The concerns about MMT were ultimately vindicated, however, 
when most major oil companies in Canada voluntarily discontinued its use in 2004 even though a 
long-awaited independent review of the substance ordered by the Canadian government had not 
yet started (ibid., 73).  In its Chapter 11 claim, Ethyl challenged the routine activities of elected 
legislators, including the “mere introduction and debate about proposed legislation in properly 
constituted legislative bodies,” as actions tantamount to expropriation (ibid., 225).   As Michalos 
(ibid.) comments, “It is difficult to imagine a more egregious attack on democracy and 
democratic process.” 
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The Metalclad case demonstrated that foreign investors’ rights can prevail over public regulation 
even where a company has an egregious record of flouting the host country’s planning rules and 
pollution standards.  The case dealt with a toxic waste dump near the Mexican city of 
Gaudalcazar.4  In just over one year, the Mexican owner illegally dumped 20,000 tons of toxic 
waste on the site without treatment or containment.  When the Mexican government shut down 
the facility in 1991, the company applied to the city for a permit to construct a hazardous waste 
landfill.  The city refused, but the federal and state governments authorized the company to 
proceed, triggering a jurisdictional dispute among the three levels of government.  Metalclad, an 
American waste disposal company, purchased the company in 1993 on condition that it obtain 
definitive permission to proceed with the project.  It dropped this condition after federal officials, 
eager to secure the foreign investment, assured Metalclad that the company had all the 
authorization it needed to undertake the project.  Metalclad started construction of the landfill 
without a municipal construction permit.  After the federal government issued a further permit 
authorizing the final phase of construction, the city issued a stop work order.  Metalclad applied 
for a municipal permit but ignored the stop work order, completing construction before the 
application was decided.  After protesters disrupted the opening of the facility, the federal 
government and Metalclad reached an agreement under which Metalclad would operate the 
landfill for five years, clean up the existing contamination and increase the capacity of the dump 
tenfold.  Ten days later the city rejected the application for a municipal permit on the grounds 
that it had been denied once before, the company had not just started but finished the project 
without a permit, there were environmental concerns about the facility, and many local residents 
opposed it.  Shortly afterward, Metalclad initiated a Chapter 11 arbitration.  While the arbitration 
was underway, the governor of the state declared an area of almost 200,000 hectares, including 
the dump site, an ecological preserve. 
 
The tribunal ruled that the local, state and federal governments’ conduct amounted to unfair and 
inequitable treatment and was tantamount to expropriation of Metalclad’s investment.  In its 
view, expropriation under NAFTA “includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged 
takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of 
the host state, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the 
effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-
expected benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host state.”5 
Applying this standard, the tribunal held that the city’s denial of a construction permit, its efforts 
to block the dump in the courts, and the federal government’s failure to ensure a transparent and 
predictable framework amounted to indirect expropriation, effectively depriving Metalclad of the 
right to operate the landfill.  It found the same to be true of the state’s ecological decree.  The 
tribunal awarded Metalclad US $16.7 million as compensation. 
 
                                                
4 The facts are drawn mainly from United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp. (2001), 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 359, 
additional reasons 95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 169 (British Columbia Supreme Court) [Metalclad (BCSC)]. 
5 Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico (2000), 5 ICSID Rev. 230 at para. 103 (NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state arbitration). 
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Mexico sought judicial review of the Metalclad award in British Columbia, because Vancouver 
had been designated as the place of arbitration (although the tribunal never met there). The court 
set aside the award in part, not because of its extraordinarily broad definition of expropriation, 
violated public policy, or took upon itself to interpret and apply Mexican constitutional and 
domestic law, but because the tribunal had exceeded the scope of the dispute submitted to it.  
The court ruled that the tribunal had gone beyond the scope of Chapter 11 by importing 
NAFTA’s general transparency obligations into Articles 1105 and 1110.  It therefore set aside 
the findings that Mexico had violated Article 1105 and that the events before the Ecological 
Decree amounted to an expropriation.  As for the Ecological Decree, the court acknowledged 
that the tribunal’s definition of expropriation was “extremely broad”: 
 
This definition is sufficiently broad to include a legitimate rezoning of property by a 
municipality or other zoning authority. However, the definition of expropriation is a 
question of law with which this Court is not entitled to interfere….6 
 
As a result, the court held that there was no ground to set aside the tribunal’s finding that the 
Decree was an act tantamount to expropriation.  The court upheld the award to that extent, 
although it reduced the amount of damages somewhat.   
 
In the SD Myers case, an American waste treatment company wished to export Polychlorinated 
Biphenyls (PCBs) from Canada to Ohio for treatment and disposal. PCBs are notorious 
carcinogens.  Canada banned their export to the US, foiling SD Myers’ plans.  As a party to the 
Basel Convention on the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes,7 Canada had an 
international legal obligation not to export hazardous wastes to non-parties, including the United 
States.  SD Myers brought a Chapter 11 suit against Canada, and won.  The tribunal held that the 
ban was a protectionist measure and had no legitimate environmental purpose.  It ordered Canada 
to pay CAN $6 million in compensation.8  The Federal Court of Canada dismissed Canada’s 
application for judicial review, remarking that the award was not contrary to public policy 
because it did not breach fundamental notions and principles of justice.  The court also refused to 
interfere with the tribunal’s characterization of the purpose of the ban because findings of fact or 
law cannot be judicially reviewed so long as they are within the scope of the submission to 
arbitration.9 
 
The Methanex decision of 200510 quelled some of the worst fears about Chapter 11 investor rights 
running roughshod over host governments’ authority to protect their citizens’ health and welfare.  
                                                
6  Metalclad (BCSC), supra note 4 at para. 99. 
7 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 22 
March 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126, 26 I.L.M. 657 (entered into force 5 May 1992). 
8 S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada (partial award – merits) (13 November  2000) (NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state 
arbitration). 
9 Canada (A.G.) v. S.D. Myers Inc., 2004 FC 38 (T.D.) (S.D. Myers (F.C.T.D)). 
10 Methanex Corp. v. U.S. (final award) (3 August 2005) (NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state arbitration). 
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The case concerned California’s ban on the sale of gasoline containing the additive methyl 
tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE). Like MMT, MTBE was originally lauded as a solution to an 
environmental and public health problem.  MMT had been introduced in the mid-1970s to replace 
lead as an octane enhancer.  MTBE was introduced in the 1990s to reduce toxic automobile 
exhaust emissions.  It is one of several ingredients, known as oxygenates, that can be used to 
boost the oxygen content of gasoline, promoting more complete combustion and reducing toxic 
air emissions. Gasoline containing these oxygenates is known as reformulated gasoline.  MTBE 
was by far the most common oxygenate in reformulated gasoline used in the United States.  
Widespread use of reformulated gasoline had the beneficial effect of reducing emissions of 
various air pollutants including the known carcinogen benzene. This beneficial effect was short-
lived, however, because MTBE and other oxygenates do not significantly reduce exhaust 
emissions from newer vehicles with advanced emissions control technology.  Along with its 
diminishing beneficial effects, MTBE has a dark side.  It is highly water-soluble, leading to a risk 
of widespread contamination of ground water via leaking underground storage tanks, and 
contamination of surface waters via discharges from motor boats. By the late 1990s, MTBE had 
been detected in several California drinking water systems. Contamination was found in both 
groundwater wells and surface reservoirs.  A major study commissioned by the State of California 
found that the State’s water resources were being placed at risk by the use of MTBE and that the 
cost of treatment of MTBE-contaminated drinking water supplies had the potential to be 
enormous.  
 
As with MMT, the scientific evidence surrounding MTBE’s health and environmental risks was 
controversial, and the California government chose to take precautionary action to limit the use of 
a potentially dangerous substance in the absence of full scientific certainty about the nature and 
degree of those risks.  It based its conclusion that use of MTBE posed a significant risk to human 
health or the environment upon a statutorily-mandated, peer-reviewed, five-volume, sixty-author, 
600-page University of California report and widespread public consultations.  It required 
warning labels to be placed on gasoline pumps and later banned the sale of gasoline containing 
MTBE.  
 
Methanex, a Canadian company, is the world’s largest producer of methanol, which is a feedstock 
for MTBE. It launched a Chapter 11 claim, arguing that the measures were discriminatory, 
tantamount to expropriation, arbitrary, inequitable, and the product of an illicit conspiracy 
between California and one of Methanex’s competitors.  The panel rejected all of Methanex’s 
claims.  It ruled that “a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in 
accordance with due process and, which affects … a foreign investor or investment is not deemed 
expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating 
government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the government 
would refrain from such regulation….”11 No such assurances had been given to Methanex.  On 
the contrary: 
 
                                                
11 Ibid., Part IV, Chapter D, p. 4. 
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Methanex entered a political economy in which it was widely known, if not notorious, that 
governmental environmental and health protection institutions at the federal and state 
level, operating under the vigilant eyes of the media, interested corporations, non-
governmental organizations and a politically active electorate, continuously monitored the 
use and impact of chemical compounds and commonly prohibited or restricted the use of 
some of those compounds for environmental and/or health reasons.12    
 
The tribunal found that California had acted carefully and reasonably with a view to protecting 
the environmental interests of Californians, not with the intent to harm foreign methanol 
producers:  
 
Faced with widespread and potentially serious MTBE contamination of its water 
resources, California ordered a careful assessment of the problem and thereafter 
responded reasonably to independent findings that large volumes of the state’s ground 
and surface water had become polluted by MTBE and that preventative measures were 
called for. The evidential record establishes no ill will towards Methanex or 
methanol….13 
 
The tribunal did not stop there.  It held that the ban on MTBE was not even covered by Chapter 
11.  Chapter 11 applies only to government measures “relating to” an investor or investment.14  
The tribunal concluded that the MTBE ban was not a measure “relating to” Methanex or its US 
investments: 
 
Having concluded … that no illicit pretext underlay California’s conduct and that 
Methanex has failed to establish that the US measures were intended to harm foreign 
methanol producers (including Methanex) or benefit domestic ethanol producers 
(including ADM), it follows…that…the US measures do not “relate to” Methanex or its 
investments as required by Article 1101(1).15  
 
The tribunal dismissed the case and ordered Methanex to pay the US government US $4 million 
in attorneys’ fees and other costs. 
 
There is still room for concern in the wake of Methanex for several reasons.  First, the Methanex 
decision is not binding on subsequent tribunals.  While Methanex ruled that non-discriminatory 
regulation of general application does not amount to expropriation unless the regulating 
government gave the investor a commitment not to regulate, other Chapter 11 tribunals have held 
that Article 1110 “does cover nondiscriminatory regulation that might be said to fall within an 
                                                
12 Ibid., p. 5. 
13 Ibid., Part IV, Chapter E, p. 9. 
14 NAFTA, supra note 1, Art. 1101(1). 
15 Methanex, supra note 10, Part IV, Chapter E, p. 10. 
  
10                                                                     CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES                                            [VOL. 05 NO. 08 
exercise of a state’s so-called police powers.”16 It is still up to each tribunal to characterize the 
intent and effect of regulatory measures, and several tribunals have held environmental and 
public health measures to be arbitrary, unfair, discriminatory, or protectionist.  
 
Second, TNCs continue to use the threat of NAFTA litigation regularly to “chill” proposed 
regulation, from the Canadian government’s “plain packaging” proposal for cigarettes in the 
early days of NAFTA, to its proposed ban on advertising “light” or “mild” cigarettes a few years 
ago.  After introducing the latter proposal to much public fanfare, the Canadian government 
quietly abandoned it shortly after the Philip Morris Company threatened a Chapter 11 claim for 
regulatory expropriation of its trademarks.  TNCs also continue to make frequent use of Chapter 
11 to challenge existing public health and environmental regulations.  For example: 
• In 2008, Dow Agroscience launched a Chapter 11 claim challenging Quebec’s ban on 
lawn care products containing the pesticide 2,4-D, one of the main ingredients in the 
notorious Agent Orange; 
• In the same year another American company launched a Chapter 11 claim challenging 
Nova Scotia’s refusal to approve a Cape Breton basalt quarry after an extensive 
enironmental impact assessment concluded it would have significant adverse 
environmental effects; and  
• In 2001, the US manufacturer of the widely banned pesticide lindane launched a Chapter 
11 claim challenging Canada’s decision to phase it out as an agricultural pesticide by 
2004 due to its adverse effects on the health of ecosystems, wildlife and people.  In 2008, 
lindane was proposed for addition to the list of outlawed chemicals under the Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.17  
 
Half of the fifty-odd Chapter 11 claims launched to date have challenged environmental or 
natural resource regulations.  A further five attacked health-related measures.18  Even if the 
success rate of Chapter 11 claims and the ratio of damages awarded to damages claimed remain 
low, the respondent governments still have to defend the claims, at a high cost to taxpayers.   
 
Finally, while NAFTA in theory establishes uniform rules for the entire continent, it is evident 
that the brunt of Chapter 11’s constraining power is felt by the continental periphery, not the 
                                                
16 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada (interim award) (26 June 2000) (NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state arbitration), p. 
32. 
17 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 22 May 2001, 40 I.L.M. 532 (entered into force 17 May 
2004). 
18 As of December 2008, a total of 55 Chapter 11 claims had been filed with the three NAFTA Parties, according to 
the NAFTA Parties’ official Chapter 11 investor-state arbitration web pages.  Of these, sufficient information was 
available to classify the subject matter of 48 of the claims.  Insufficient information was available to classify seven 
claims.  See Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “Dispute Settlement: NAFTA – Chapter 11 – 
Investment,” http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-
diff/NAFTA.aspx?lang=en; Mexico, Ministry of the Economy, “Dispute Settlement,” 
http://www.economia.gob.mx/?P=5500; and US Department of State, “NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations,” 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm.    
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centre.  The United States has not yet lost a Chapter 11 claim and had its laws or regulations 
declared to violate investor rights, whereas Canada and Mexico have lost two decisions each.   
Claims have been aimed mainly at Canada and Mexico (24 against Canada, 18 against Mexico 
and 13 against the US, as of December 31, 2008),19 reflecting the reality that the United States is 
home to most of the TNCs benefited by Chapter 11.  
 
All of this is not meant to suggest that investor rights provisions of NAFTA and BITs clamp an 
“iron cage” on host governments’ ability to regulate foreign investment.  Some governments 
faced with adverse investment arbitration decisions, particularly in Latin America, have simply 
refused to pay or have negotiated settlements with victorious investors in which they have paid 
pennies on the dollar.  Other governments have openly flouted investment rules, effectively 
daring investors to challenge their actions.  Newfoundland premier Danny Williams recently 
nationalized an unprofitable pulp and paper mill after its American owner closed it.  Even some 
governments in the periphery of the continental or global economy can, in practice, flout these 
emerging norms if they want to badly enough.  But this may be costly: in the ruthless world of 
transnational investment, it may result in capital flight, bad credit ratings and expensive legal 
proceedings.  Ultimately, if such governments want to attract and keep foreign investment, they 
must signal global capital markets that they take their investment obligations seriously. 
 
In short, there is a substantial basis for critics’ concerns that Chapter 11 can undermine efforts to 
enact new laws and regulations in the public interest, in particular to protect the environment and 
human health, and that it can require governments to pay compensation to polluters for ceasing 
to pollute, even if their activities have an adverse impact on public health and welfare (Mann & 
Von Moltke 2001, 13). With its intrusive judicial institutions, NAFTA’s dynamic continental 
economic regime creates new levels of uncertainty for governments whose elected officials 
cannot be sure how measures they propose to implement might be judged by some future arbitral 
tribunal.  As Been and Beauvais conclude,  
 
The uncertainty over how far NAFTA can be pushed to provide protection for property 
owners, coupled with federal, state and local regulators’ unfamiliarity with NAFTA…and 
concerns about both the expense of defending against NAFTA claims and about their 
potential liability for compensation awards, at the very least make NAFTA a useful threat 
for those who oppose environmental and land use regulation. 
 
 
B. TRANSNATIONAL INVESTORS’ RIGHTS PREVAIL OVER ORDINARY LAW 
 
The second remarkable feature of the investor rights in NAFTA and BITs is that they – or more 
precisely, the arbitral decisions applying them – are effective and enforceable in the host 
                                                
19 The figure for the US includes more than one hundred individual claims launched by Canadian cattlemen over the 
closure of the US border to Canadian beef in the wake of a mad cow disease scare.  These claims were consolidated 
into a single case and are treated as one case on the government Chapter 11 web pages cited in the previous note. 
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country’s legal system without the need for, and indeed in spite of, government legislative action.  
By virtue of international treaties on enforcement of arbitral awards and ubiquitous international 
commercial arbitration statutes, investor-state arbitration awards are enforceable in domestic legal 
systems as if they were awards of a domestic court.  Moreover, they are insulated against 
challenge in domestic courts.  International investor rights thus take effect in national legal 
systems without the need for the intervening step of enacting or amending domestic legislation or 
constitutions.  Indeed, since the whole point of many Chapter 11 claims is to invalidate existing 
legislative measures, they take effect despite conflicting legislative or constitutional provisions. 
 
One of the hallmarks of a constitution is that it takes precedence over ordinary laws, regulations 
and government decisions.  Applying this concept of constitutional primacy to international 
norms poses serious difficulties.  In the European Union primacy is expressed most often in the 
doctrine of direct effect according to which Community legal norms become the law of each land, 
creating enforceable legal obligations not just between individuals and their governments, but 
among individuals themselves (Weiler 1999, 19).  These norms may be invoked by individuals 
before national courts, and national courts must provide adequate remedies for their violation just 
as if they had been enacted by national legislatures.   
 
Direct effect on its own does not distinguish supraconstitutional from ordinary international law.  
In some nation states international treaties are received automatically into the domestic legal 
order. Canadian law generally subscribes to the competing view that international treaties are not 
incorporated automatically but must be "received" via implementing legislation in order to take 
effect within the domestic legal system. Hundreds of international treaties have been received into 
Canadian federal and provincial law in this manner.   
 
Supraconstitutional primacy refers to international norms taking effect in the domestic legal 
system in the absence of domestic legislation or even in the face of conflicting domestic 
legislation, not by virtue of it.  Canadian reception of customary international law, which consists 
of customs rooted in widespread state practice and recognized as binding by states in their 
relations with each other, comes closer to what we mean because, in theory, it is received 
automatically into Canadian law as part of the common law.20  But direct effect alone does not 
qualify a norm as supraconstitutional.  Even in Europe where direct effect is widespread and 
presumptive, it is the combination of direct effect and the doctrine of supremacy that makes 
Community law supraconstitutional (Weiler 1999, 20).   
 
The doctrine of supremacy holds that, within the Community’s sphere of competence, any 
Community norm “‘trumps’ conflicting national law whether enacted before or after the 
Community norm” (ibid., 20-21).  The Community’s own judicial organ, the European Court of 
Justice, has the authority to determine the Community’s sphere of competence and hence the 
matters on which Community law is supreme (ibid., 21).   
 
                                                
20 R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26. 
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Even if the reception of customary international law into domestic Canadian law is an example of 
direct effect, it is not an example of primacy.  A norm of customary international law that is 
received as part of the common law would not prevail over conflicting domestic legislation, since 
legislation prevails over common law.  Moreover, while legislation is presumed to be consistent 
with Canada’s international legal obligations, it prevails over international law in the event of a 
conflict (van Ert 2002, 99-136; Kindred 2006, 19-21).   
 
EU-style direct effect and supremacy represent the fullest expression of supraconstitutional 
primacy in the contemporary world and distinguish the European legal order from other 
supranational orders.  Nevertheless, international norms and institutions may be 
supraconstitutional without reaching the European standard.  Here we part company with those 
who insist that only Europe has a supraconstitution.  But we do not go as far as others who see a 
supranational constitution in the UN Charter, basic principles of inter-sovereign relations, or 
international human rights law (Tomuschat 1999, Johnston 2005, MacDonald 2005, Fassbender 
2005).  In our logic, international norms and institutions are supraconstitutional if they establish 
constraints on the authority of governments that are legally binding, practically effective, and 
difficult to amend. Outside the EU, the leading candidates for this status are the rules of the 
international trade and investment regime.   
 
Investor-state arbitral awards under NAFTA and BITs qualify for constitutional primacy because 
they are enforceable directly in almost any domestic legal system where the successful investor 
believes the losing government might have assets.  They will be enforced even in the face of 
conflicting legislation, including the very laws or regulations that were declared to violate the 
investors’ rights.  Moreover, these awards are insulated from review by domestic courts.  Courts 
in Canada, the US and many other countries have abandoned their traditional hostility to 
arbitration and embraced the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  As the Ontario Court of 
Appeal put it, “predictability in the enforcement of dispute resolution provisions is an 
indispensable precondition to any international business transaction and facilitates and encourages 
the pursuit of freer trade on an international scale.”21  
 
Courts will review awards only on very narrow grounds, such as where the tribunal decided 
matters beyond the scope of the dispute, violated due process, or issued a decision inconsistent 
with the public policy of the reviewing jurisdiction.  All these grounds are construed narrowly, 
with a strong presumption in favour of enforcing the award.  The public policy ground, for 
example, is much more limited than it sounds.  An award will be set aside on this basis only 
where its enforcement would violate the most basic norms of morality and justice in the legal 
system of the country where the award is invoked, such as where the award is tainted by fraud, 
bribery, corruption, perjury, breach of rules of natural justice, or failure of due process.22  An 
                                                
21 Automatic Systems Inc. v. Bracknell Corp, 1994 CanLII 1871 (On. C.A.) at 13, 18 O.R. (3d) 257, 113 D.L.R. (4th) 
449. 
22 Corporacion Transnacional de Inversiones S.A. de C.V. v. STET International S.p.A. (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 183 
(S.C.J.), affirmed (2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 414 (C.A.); leave to appeal refused (2001), [2000] S.C.C.A. No. 581, 271 
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award will not be considered contrary to public policy merely because it got the facts or law 
wrong, or is inconsistent with “public policy” understood in the ordinary sense of the political 
positions manifested in legislation, regulations, or judicial decisions.23  As the Federal Court of 
Canada said when asked to review the S.D. Myers Chapter 11 award, “public policy does not refer 
to a political position, it refers to ‘fundamental notions and principles of justice’.”24 Not 
surprisingly, public policy rarely succeeds as a ground to invalidate international arbitral awards.    
 
 
C. DIFFICULT TO CHANGE 
 
Like constitutional norms, international investment rules are difficult to amend or repeal.  They 
represent a form of precommitment strategy, an effort to bind future governments to particular 
core values, principles and rules.  In theory, states may withdraw from these arrangements.  
Withdrawal from NAFTA or the World Trade Organization (WTO) is possible upon six months’ 
notice.25  This prospect was mooted publicly by then-Senators Obama and Clinton in the 2008 
race for the Democratic presidential nomination, although President Obama’s team quietly 
reassured the Canadian government that he did not really mean it.   
 
Unlike NAFTA and the WTO, termination of BITs is typically permitted only after ten years, 
and their rules continue in force for a further ten to twenty years for investments made during the 
period of the BIT.   
 
Even if possible in theory, exit is not a feasible option for Canada, let alone for economically 
weaker countries (Schneiderman 2000a, 771).  Canada is not much more likely to want to incur 
the wrath of more powerful economic forces in the United States than developing countries are 
likely to want to incur the wrath of more powerful economic forces in Canada and other 
industrialized countries (cf. Unger 1998, 82-84). Moreover, the network of international trade 
and investment agreements is so extensive, entrenched and interwoven that fundamental 
renegotiation of its terms is not a feasible option for individual disgruntled governments.  The 
international trade and investment regime subjects nation-states’ exercise of public regulatory 
authority to an unusual degree of external control (Van Harten and Loughlin 2006).  The 
infeasibility of exit or renegotiation means that this external control is unlikely to relax in the 
short or even the medium term. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
N.R. 394 (note) (S.C.C.); Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. International Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d 150 at 152 
(2nd Cir. 1998). 
23 Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 50 B.C.L.R. (2d) 207 (C.A.); leave to appeal refused (1990), 50 
B.C.L.R. (2d) xxviii (S.C.C.). 
24 Canada (A.G.) v. S.D. Myers Inc. (2004), 2004 FC 38 at para. 76 (T.D.). 
25 NAFTA, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., Article 2205; Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, 15 April 1994, reprinted in World Trade Organization, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Article XV. 
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This is what champions of free trade meant when they described NAFTA as “locking in” 
neoconservatism – despite the fact that the neoconservative model was and is no closer to being 
accepted as a sustainable societal contract in Canada than it is elsewhere (Clark 1997).  Even if 
political parties that reject this neoconservative model were to win power, they would find their 
hands tied by an internationally negotiated and domestically implemented supraconstitution to 
which their predecessors had committed them – unless they were willing to violate or withdraw 
from it and pay the resulting costs involved in their trading partners’ commercial or political 
retaliation. 
 
Unlike domestic laws, the investor rights conferred by NAFTA and BITs cannot be amended 
unilaterally by any one state.   As BITs with NAFTA-style investment rights proliferate, the 
difficulty of exit or renegotiation increases.  From this perspective, the failure of the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment can now be seen as a victory for neoconservative constitutionalism, 
since it would likely be harder to renegotiate the thousands of BITs that took its place than a 
single multilateral investment treaty.  This resistance to change is an important part of what 
makes these rights supraconstitutional.  As Schwartz and Bueckert (2006, 483) assert glibly, 
“[b]ecause it would be politically and economically difficult for Canada to withdraw from 
NAFTA, the treaty provisions have quasi-constitutional force.” 
 
 
IV. Reasons for Concern about the Emerging Supraconstitution 
 
Why should anyone care whether the investor rights and investment arbitration provisions of 
NAFTA and BITs have achieved de facto constitutional status in the legal orders of participating 
states?  Because these investor protections are inconsistent with domestic constitutional and legal 
arrangements in at least some participating states, especially regarding takings of private property; 
they are enjoyed only by foreign investors, not by nationals; their meaning is determined by 
private adjudicators outside national democratic processes; their benefits and burdens are 
distributed very unevenly; and these emerging supraconstitutional norms have not been 
legitimated by a constitutive demos. 
 
 
A. INCONSISTENCY WITH NATIONAL LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 
 
The first reason for concern about these supraconstitutional norms is that the investor rights in 
NAFTA and BITs may contradict existing constitutional and legal norms in host countries.  Take 
Canada as an example.  NAFTA Chapter 11 provides substantially greater protection of private 
property rights than the Canadian constitution or legislation.  Its rights for foreign investors are 
unprecedented in Canadian law and inconsistent with the treatment of private property in the 
Canadian constitution, which gives no protection against the taking of private property.  Property 
rights were excluded deliberately from Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, 
because they would excessively enhance corporate power, which was thought to be adequately 
protected by the common law and ordinary legislation.  Notwithstanding this deliberate 
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constitutional choice, just a few years later CUFTA introduced into Canada’s legal system a 
guarantee of property rights for foreign investors modelled after the takings clause of the US 
Constitution.26  Soon afterward, NAFTA reconfirmed these rights and extended them to Mexican 
investors.  The effect of these provisions, as Been and Beauvais (2003, 143) conclude, is not 
merely to “internationalize” the US Takings Clause, but to “extend the scope of potential 
regulatory takings claims in significant respects.” This was understood at the time neither 
(apparently) by the Canadian government nor (certainly) by the public.  
 
It is true that the Canadian constitution protects some aspects of property rights, including 
security against unreasonable search and seizure, freedom to use one’s property for expressive 
purposes, freedom to trade on the Sabbath, protection against racially-motivated confiscations 
such as those inflicted on Japanese Canadians in World War II, and protection of aboriginal 
property rights.  But there is no constitutional protection against deprivation of private property, 
and no constitutional requirement for compensation in the event of a taking.  The contrast 
between NAFTA and the Canadian constitution in this respect is stark.   
 
On its face, NAFTA also goes well beyond the protection accorded to private property rights by 
ordinary Canadian law.  Contrary to NAFTA Article 1110, common law rules of statutory 
interpretation provide that legislation may validly deprive citizens of property without 
compensation, provided that the statutory language clearly dictates this result.27  In practice, 
provincial and federal expropriation laws provide for procedural due process and compensation, 
but there are exceptions and in any event these rules can be amended or repealed by the 
legislatures that enacted them.  Canadian courts usually grant minimal compensation for 
expropriation, while NAFTA Article 1110 requires compensation to be prompt, fully realizable, 
freely transferable, and equivalent to fair market value immediately before the expropriation 
(Schwartz & Bueckert 2006).  While human rights legislation such as the Canadian Bill of 
Rights28 and some provincial statutes29 contain provisions protecting private property rights, 
courts have generally interpreted them narrowly and been reluctant to apply them to invalidate 
laws.  Finally, Canadian courts have shied away from the American notion of “regulatory 
takings” implicit in NAFTA’s reference to measures “tantamount to expropriation.”   
This latter point is crucial to understanding NAFTA’s significance for Canadian public law and 
policy. According to the US “regulatory takings” concept, government regulation that falls short 
of direct expropriation can nevertheless amount to an illegal taking.  As Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes wrote in 1922, “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes 
too far it will be recognized as a taking.”30 In the United States the concept of regulatory takings 
                                                
26 The Takings Clause provides that “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”  
U.S. Const., amend. V.   
27 In other words, courts will not interpret a statute to take away property without compensation unless the statutory 
language clearly demands otherwise.  Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. R. [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101. 
28 S.C. 1960, c. 44, s. 1, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III.  
29 E.g. Alberta Bill of Rights, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-14, s. 1.  
30 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160 (1922). 
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has been invoked to challenge all kinds of regulation.  Since the 1980s, “property-rights 
advocates have turned in increasing numbers to ‘takings’ arguments as a way to galvanize public 
support and roll back what they argue to be oppressive governmental interference with the rights 
of private property” (Underkuffler-Freund 1996, 162; see also Epstein 1985). They have won 
important victories in state and federal courts, and have succeeded in enacting ballot measures 
and statutes in several states requiring compensation for reductions in property value resulting 
from land-use regulation.   
 
After decades of confusion, some clarity has finally emerged in the US Supreme Court’s 
regulatory takings jurisprudence (Kent 2008). Compensation may be required for either total or 
partial regulatory takings (Meltz 2007).31  A total regulatory taking occurs when regulation 
deprives the owner of all economically beneficial uses of the property and renders the property 
economically idle.  Thus, in the Lucas case, a local council in South Carolina designated a 
beachfront area as unavailable for development under a state statute for the protection of 
ecologically sensitive seacoast property, prohibiting the owner of affected beachfront lots from 
erecting any permanent structures on his land.  The US Supreme Court held this to be a taking.32   
 
When government action falls short of total deprivation of the property’s economic use or value, 
a partial regulatory taking may still be found if the impugned regulation is “functionally 
equivalent” to direct appropriation or ouster.33  This will depend on the severity of the economic 
impact on the property owner, the degree of interference with the owner’s reasonable 
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.34 The intent of the 
Takings clause, according to the Court, is to prevent the government “from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens that, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”35 Thus, requiring landowners to dedicate a public greenway over a portion of their 
property or allow public access to a privately owned beach as a condition for issuing a building 
permit, has been held a taking,36 as has an interim ordinance prohibiting construction of any 
structures in a flood zone.37  Even regulations that predate the plaintiff’s acquisition of title may 
                                                
31 U.S. law also recognizes that a regulatory action that results in a permanent physical occupation of property is a 
taking per se (Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)), but we are more concerned 
here with public welfare regulation that restricts private property use without physically invading it.   
32 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992). 
33 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). 
34 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
35 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
36 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
37 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
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qualify as takings.38  In general, the purpose behind the regulations (environmental protection, 
public health, etc.) is not considered relevant.39 
 
On the other hand, the US Supreme Court has dismissed many regulatory takings claims, 
including challenges to rent control regulation,40 restrictions on surface mining of prime 
farmlands,41 requirements to restore original slope contours after surface mining,42 temporary 
land development moratoria,43 and the use of historical landmark designation to prevent 
construction of a skyscraper atop an historic building.44  The Court has recognized fairly wide 
scope for government regulation, holding that “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some 
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change 
in the general law,”45 and that deprivation of a property’s most profitable use is not, in itself, a 
taking.46  As a result, regulatory takings claims remain a “difficult sell” in the United States 
(Meltz 2007, 371). 
 
Nonetheless, they are an even harder sell in Canada.  Two requirements must be met to make out 
a claim for a de facto taking requiring compensation in Canada: (1) an acquisition by the Crown 
of an interest in the property or flowing from it, and (2) deprivation of all reasonable uses of the 
property.47  Not even a “total” taking of the kind found in Lucas would normally be considered a 
de facto expropriation in Canada.  In circumstances similar to Lucas, the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal in Mariner Real Estate upheld a provincial government’s prohibition of development of 
beachfront lots.48  The provincial government designated the plaintiffs’ beachfront lots in 
Kingsburg, Nova Scotia, as a beach under the Beaches Act.49  Once designated, all development 
on such lands – from trails to fences to buildings – was prohibited unless authorized by the 
Minister.  The plaintiffs applied for permission to build single family residences on their lots.  
                                                
38 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
39 In Lingle, the Court held that whether the government action substantially advances a legitimate state interest is 
not an appropriate consideration in regulatory takings cases.  The focus, rather, is on the action’s impact on the 
private property. Lingle, supra note __. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) 
42 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
43 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
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46 Penn Central, supra note 34, 125. 
47 Canadian Pacific Railway v. Vancouver (City), 2006 SCC 5, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 227 at para 30. 
48 Mariner Real Estate Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (A.G.) (1999) 26 R.P.R. (3d) 37, 177 D.L.R. (4th) 696, 68 L.C.R. 1, 178 
N.S.R. (2d) 294, 549 A.P.R. 294, [1999] N.S.J. No. 283 (C.A.). 
49 R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 32. 
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An environmental study commissioned by the government concluded that the houses should not 
be constructed due to the sensitive nature of the dune landforms and the likely damage to the 
houses themselves from the breakdown of the dune system.  The provincial government refused 
the applications.  The plaintiffs sued, claiming that their lands had, in effect, been expropriated 
and they were entitled to compensation under the provincial expropriation statute.  The trial 
judge agreed, but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision.   
 
The Court of Appeal concluded that “US constitutional law has, on this issue, taken a 
fundamentally different path than has Canadian law”.50  It held that regulatory taking claims in 
Canada are constrained by two governing principles: 
 
The first is that valid legislation … or action taken lawfully with legislative authority may 
very significantly restrict an owner’s enjoyment of private land.  The second is that the 
Courts may order compensation for such restriction only where authorized to do so by 
legislation.  …In short, the bundle of rights associated with ownership carries with it the 
possibility of stringent … regulation.51 
 
The question posed in US takings cases is therefore fundamentally different from that before a 
Canadian court.  While deprivation of economically beneficial or productive use qualifies as a 
taking of land in the United States, it does not in Canada, even when the deprivation is drastic.  
The appropriate question, rather, is whether the effect of regulation is to eliminate “virtually all 
rights associated with ownership”.52 This is a considerably higher threshold.  The court held that 
“[p]reclusion of residential development …, particularly on lands of this environmental 
sensitivity, is not, of itself, the extinguishment of virtually all rights associated with 
ownership.”53  The plaintiffs had not shown that other traditional or reasonable uses were 
precluded, such as walking, camping, taking pictures, gardening, horseback riding, or grazing 
livestock.  Nor had they shown that they were precluded from environmentally appropriate 
development other than houses built on standard concrete foundations.  They therefore retained 
some of the normal rights and incidents of ownership, precluding a finding of de facto 
expropriation.  In contrast, the fact that the plaintiff could still engage in camping on his 
beachfront property did not prevent the US Supreme Court from finding a taking in Lucas.   
 
The Mariner case also highlighted a second major difference between American and Canadian 
takings law.  Unlike the United States, where a plaintiff need not prove that the state acquires 
any interest in the land regulated, de facto expropriation will only be recognized in Canada if 
there is an acquisition of an interest in land by the Crown.  The court in Mariner held that the 
development freeze and strict environmental regulation of beachfront property did not confer any 
interest in the land on the Province.  Even if the measures enhanced the value of publicly owned 
                                                
50 Mariner Real Estate Ltd., supra note 48 at para. 101.  
51 Ibid.at paras. 38-39.  
52 Ibid.at paras. 5, 50 and 85.  
53 Ibid.at para. 85. 
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property (for example, the public portion of the beach), the court held that regulation enhancing 
the value of public property is not an acquisition of an interest in land.54   
 
The Mariner case was endorsed recently by the Supreme Court of Canada in a decision that 
further underlined the contrast between Canadian and US regulatory takings law.  The US 
Supreme Court has found regulatory takings where the government required private owners to 
grant public beach access or create a public greenway over a portion of their property as a 
condition for issuance of building permit.55 By contrast, when the City of Vancouver amended its 
Official Plan to require an entire privately owned property – a discontinued Canadian Pacific 
Railways (CPR) rail corridor – to be used only as a public thoroughfare for transportation or 
greenways, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld this as valid regulatory action notwithstanding 
the fact that the effect of the by-law was to “freeze the redevelopment potential of the corridor 
and to confine CPR to uneconomic uses of the land.”56  The court held that neither of the two 
requirements for a regulatory taking was satisfied.  The Court rejected CPR’s argument that the 
City had in effect acquired a public park, concluding that the City “has gained nothing more than 
some assurance that the land will be used or developed in accordance with its vision, without 
even precluding the historical or current use of the land.”57  Furthermore, the Court held that the 
by-law did not remove all reasonable uses of the land, noting that it did not prevent CPR from 
operating a railway on the land, maintaining the railway track, leasing the land for use in 
conformity with the by-law, or developing public/private partnerships.  Finally, the Court held 
that even if the facts could support the inference of a de facto taking, that inference had been 
conclusively negated by a section in a provincial statute providing that the City was not liable to 
compensate landowners for loss as a result of by-law restrictions, and that property affected by a 
by-law was deemed not to have been “taken” by the City.  As the Court said, the legislature has 
the power to alter the common law, and by providing that the effects of the by-law cannot 
amount to a taking, “it has rendered inapplicable the common law de facto taking remedy upon 
which CPR relies.”58  This reinforces a crucial difference between takings law in Canada and the 
United States: Because protection against takings is not constitutionally entrenched in Canada, it 
can be modified or removed by legislation. 
 
What does all of this tell us about NAFTA’s investor protections?  The phrase “measure 
tantamount to nationalization or expropriation” is not defined in NAFTA, and there have only 
been a few tribunal decisions interpreting it (which we discussed above).  But it is already clear 
that the rights incorporated into NAFTA – national treatment, most favoured nation treatment, 
                                                
54 Ibid., paras. 93-101 (distinguishing British Columbia v. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533, in which the Crown’s 
prohibition of mining resulted in recovery of the mineral rights that had previously been granted to the plaintiff, and 
Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. R., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101, in which the legislation that deprived a company of its goodwill 
also conferred that goodwill upon a Crown corporation). 
55 Nollan and Dolan, supra note 36. 
56 CPR, supra note 47, para. 8. 
57 Ibid., para. 33.  
58 Ibid., para. 37. 
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protection against expropriation, no performance requirements, minimum international standard 
of treatment – are on their face inconsistent with the Canadian constitution and other Canadian 
laws.  It is clear that they are much more closely aligned with American law than with either 
Canadian or – as we will see shortly – Mexican law (Starner 2002).  It is also clear that Chapter 
11 “adopts wholesale” the rights that American TNCs had long demanded in their dealings 
abroad, and that the US government had advocated on their behalf (Afilalo 2001).  The formula 
for compensation adopted in NAFTA – prompt, adequate (i.e., fair market value), effective, fully 
realizable and freely transferable – was the same one called for by the US government and 
industry in bilateral and multilateral fora, especially in relation to nationalizations by developing 
states in the Third World.  The United States has long argued that this stringent compensation 
formula is the standard required by international law.  Thus are NAFTA’s investor rights more in 
line with American legal norms than with those of the other continental trade partners.   
 
We can go farther.  Investors’ rights under Chapter 11 may be more expansive even than in 
American law.  As Echeverria points out, the language of NAFTA Article 1110 is quite different 
from that of the US Takings Clause, and the rulings of NAFTA tribunals are essentially 
unreviewable in Canadian or US courts, “practically ensuring that the international law of 
takings will evolve along a separate and independent path from domestic takings law” 
(Echeverria 2006, 984).  At the very least, the contrast between the Canadian and American law 
of takings, and the decades of confusion within US regulatory takings jurisprudence, indicate 
that the line between valid public welfare regulation and actions “tantamount to expropriation” 
can be drawn in very different places.   
 
A discussion of NAFTA’s investor rights would be incomplete without considering their 
implications for NAFTA’s third partner, Mexico.  If NAFTA Chapter 11 represents a “minimal 
shift” in US takings law and a “significant shift” for Canadian takings law, it represents a major 
departure from Mexico's highly interventionist constitutional takings tradition (Starner 2002, 
428, 431).  Experience in Mexico and some other Latin American countries that have signed 
Chapter 11-like investment treaties indicates that if investment treaties contradict domestic 
constitutional rules, so much the worse for the constitution.  The modern constitutions of Mexico 
and other post-colonial countries were shaped substantially by those countries’ experiences with 
and reactions against transnational, especially American, capital.  Like those of many other 
developing and less developed states, the Mexican constitution vested in the state a monopoly 
over certain key economic sectors along with authority to intervene in the market to steer 
economic development, redistribute wealth, and resist foreign influence.  Article 27 of Mexico’s 
constitution contains a version of the famous “Calvo Clause,” traceable to the writings of 
nineteenth century Argentinian jurist, Carlos Calvo.59  As Schneiderman explains:  
 
Based on the dismal Latin American experience with interventionist international capital, 
Calvo argued that the countries of Latin America were entitled to the same degree of 
respect for their internal sovereignty as the United States of America and the countries of 
                                                
59 Constitución Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos  Ch. 1, Art. 27 (“Mex. Const.”). 
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Europe.  Among Calvo’s precepts is the proposition that states should be free, within 
reason, from interference in the conduct of their domestic policy (Schneiderman 2000b, 
89).  
 
This doctrine contained two basic principles: absolute equality of treatment of aliens and 
nationals and non-intervention by the home state in the event of a dispute between an alien 
investor and the host country (Starner 2002).  Firstly, foreign investors who chose to establish 
themselves within the territory of the host state had no greater protection from state action 
(including expropriation) than nationals, were only entitled to pursue domestic remedies, and 
were prohibited from seeking diplomatic intervention by their home state, in some cases on pain 
of forfeiture of their property rights.   Home states were prohibited against intervening, 
diplomatically or otherwise, to enforce their citizens’ rights in the face of nationalization or 
expropriation of their property.  The intent was for government action, including nationalization, 
to be judged by domestic standards in domestic courts, not by “international” standards dictated 
by the major capital exporting nations.   
 
The Mexican constitution also establishes national sovereignty over and state ownership of 
natural resources, limits foreign ownership, authorizes expropriation of private property for 
public use (subject to payment of indemnity), and authorizes the regulation of private property 
and natural resources for the collective good, “to ensure a more equitable distribution of public 
wealth, to conserve them, to achieve the well-balanced development of the country and the 
improvement of the living conditions of the rural and urban population.”60 Such regulation does 
not give rise to a right to compensation even though it may drastically diminish the value of 
private property or eliminate almost all rights of ownership (Starner 2002, 414).   
 
These constitutional provisions reflected a distinct Latin American brand of constitutionalism, 
which Cox called “state capitalism” (Cox 1996b). State capitalism emerged as an alternative to 
both Western capitalist imperialism and Soviet socialism.  It emphasized state control of key 
economic sectors, intervention in the market to redistribute wealth, and insulation from external 
economic and political pressures.  It was never accepted by the United States and the capital 
exporting states of Europe, although some of its principles were included in United Nations 
General Assembly resolutions associated with the proposed New International Economic Order 
in the 1970s.  By the 1990s, state capitalism was in disfavour, pushed aside by its main post-Cold 
War rival, the neoconservative constitutionalism we described in Chapter 2.   Developing 
countries in Latin America and elsewhere began to implement massive constitutional reforms to 
relinquish state control of the commanding heights of the economy, reduce or eliminate limits on 
foreign ownership and control, and roll back the state’s central role in redistributing wealth and 
directing economic and social development.    
 
In Mexico, some 30 constitutional provisions that gave expression to the Calvo Doctrine and the 
state-capitalist model of constitutionalism were amended in the lead-up to NAFTA.  One of these 
                                                
60 Ibid., quoted in Starner 2002: 414. 
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amendments precipitated the Zapatista armed uprising in Chiapas, by authorizing the 
redistribution of “underused” collective rural land to campesinos (Schneiderman 2000a, 766).  
While the Calvo Clause remained formally intact it was erased implicitly, at least as regards 
NAFTA parties, by a series of non-constitutional and legislative edicts (ibid.; Flores 2005).  In 
effect, the Mexican constitution was made to submit to NAFTA’s discipline.   
 
This phenomenon is not restricted to NAFTA.  Governments in Latin America and elsewhere 
that once pursued a state-capitalist development path have increasingly become parties to BITs 
and regional free trade agreements that incorporate NAFTA-style investor rights.  When such 
arrangements conflict with domestic constitutional arrangements, the latter have often been 
jettisoned.  The Colombia-United Kingdom BIT of 1994 contained the usual provisions 
concerning national treatment, most favoured nation treatment, and prohibition against 
expropriations except for a public purpose and upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation that is fully realizable and transferable.  When the legislation implementing the 
BIT was presented to the Colombian Constitutional Court for certification, as required by the 
constitution, the Court held that the BIT violated the Colombian Constitution of 1991 in two 
ways.  First, by guaranteeing compensation for expropriation, it contradicted a provision that 
authorized expropriation without compensation for reasons of equity.  Second, by granting 
British investors preferential treatment that was not available to Colombian nationals, it violated 
the equality provisions of the constitution.  The response of the Colombian government was to 
amend the constitution in 1999 to no longer permit expropriation without the payment of 
compensation. As Schneiderman concludes, “[h]ere is a clear instance of [neoconservative] 
constitutionalism disciplining a domestic constitutional text: Interference with private property 
and investment rights simply is beyond the bounds of acceptability” (Schneiderman 2000b, 106-
108).   
 
While some litigants have argued that NAFTA violates domestic constitutions, these arguments 
have not so far met with success in the domestic courts of the NAFTA parties.61 
 
 
B. ENJOYED ONLY BY FOREIGN INVESTORS 
 
The second reason for concern about the rights conferred on foreign investors by NAFTA and 
BITs is that they are enjoyed only by foreign investors, not by nationals.  This is not meant as a 
sop to nationalist or xenophobic sentiment; rather, it is meant simply to emphasize that these 
supraconstitutional norms favour transnational capital and discriminate against nationals.  To 
                                                
61 In Canada, for example, the Council of Canadians (a leading nationalist organization) launched a constitutional 
challenge against NAFTA Chapter 11 claiming (inter alia) that it violated Canadian constitutional rules giving the 
superior courts the mandate to interpret Canadian laws, but it was dismissed by the trial judge.  Council of 
Canadians v. Canada (A.-G.), Doc. No. 01-CV-208141 (Ont. Super. Ct. J., 8 July 2005), 2005 CanLII 28426; aff’d 
(2006), 277D.L.R. (4th) 527 (Ont. C.A.), 149 C.R.R. (2d) 290. 
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return to the Canadian example, NAFTA investor rights are not available to Canadian investors in 
Canada.  They are enjoyed only by American and (theoretically) Mexican investors.  For practical 
purposes, this means transnational corporations.  The more citizens’ groups understood that 
foreign transnationals had been given rights to nullify domestic legislation that were not just 
beyond recourse in domestic courts, but were unavailable to Canadian enterprise, the more 
Chapter 11 and NAFTA as a whole were delegitimized.  Moreover, these enhanced rights are not 
balanced by any corresponding obligations.  The new justiciable empowerment accorded by trade 
agreements to transnational corporations subjects them to no balancing obligations enforced by 
continental-level institutions with the clout to regulate, tax, or monitor transnational business in 
the newly created continental market (Blank and Krajewski 1995).  Chapter 11 expanded the 
scope of investment rights with no corresponding requirements on TNCs to promote the public 
interest by, for example, protecting the environment or public health.  Some commentators 
suggest that the solution to the disparate treatment of foreign investors and nationals instituted by 
NAFTA and BITs is to extend similar rights and privileges to nationals.  “Ideally,” one article 
predicts hopefully, “better remedies for ‘regulatory takings’ under international law will pressure 
Canadian authorities to adopt a more generous compensatory approach for their own citizens” 
(Schwartz and Bueckert 2006, 485). The economic supraconstitution itself thus becomes a tool to 
advance a neoconservative project to transform domestic constitutions, laws and public policies.    
 
 
C. ADJUDICATION OF EXERCISES OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY OUTSIDE NATIONAL 
DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 
 
Chapter 11’s investor-state dispute system represents an almost unprecedented privatization of 
public law adjudication (Dunberry 2001).  Rather than challenging government action in 
domestic courts or before administrative tribunals, disgruntled investors may take the offending 
government to private international commercial arbitration where trade law experts will 
determine the validity of the government’s exercise of public power.  This is a most unusual way 
to challenge states’ exercise of their public authority to regulate business.  For example in one 
Chapter 11 case, Metalclad, the tribunal held that, as a matter of Mexican law, a municipal 
government had no constitutional authority to authorize or prohibit construction of a hazardous 
waste dump that had been authorized by the federal government – a judgment that hitherto only 
the Mexican courts had the power to make (ibid.).  
 
International commercial arbitration developed as a means to resolve transnational business 
disputes between commercial parties.  Its norms of confidentiality (according to which the 
existence, nature and outcome of disputes remain secret unless the parties agree otherwise) and 
party autonomy (according to which parties have complete freedom to choose the laws by which 
their disputes will be governed, the forum in which they will be decided and the judges who will 
adjudicate them) may facilitate transnational commerce, but they are deeply at odds with 
contemporary norms for challenging governments’ exercises of public authority in democratic 
societies. 
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Public transparency and participation were the first casualties of Chapter 11.  One of the most 
significant and hard-won developments in public administration in the past generation has been 
the establishment of the public’s right to transparency of and participation in government 
decision-making. Previously, closed-door negotiations between government authorities and 
regulated industries were the norm for the development, implementation and enforcement of 
regulatory standards. Legislative hearings were unintelligible or inaccessible to many citizens 
and civil society organizations, and often not where the real business of government was 
conducted. The development of rules and regulations was secretive and mysterious except to 
governments and the affected industries.  Only directly affected parties were entitled to receive 
notice of proposed administrative decisions or challenge government actions in court.  Members 
of the public were mere supplicants before unanswerable bureaucracies (Sax 1971).   
 
Now in Canada, the United States and many other countries, members of the public have 
enforceable legal rights to receive notice of, and comment on, a wide variety of proposed 
administrative rules and decisions, obtain information held by governments, and challenge 
government action and inaction in courts and administrative tribunals (eg. Richardson and 
Razzaque 2006).  Not just industry but concerned citizens and public interest groups now have 
standing to challenge government decision-making.  Courts and tribunals are more liberal in 
allowing public interest groups to intervene as amicus curiae (friends of the court) to make 
submissions on the validity of public law and policy.  Increasingly, citizens themselves may go 
to court to enforce laws when governments fail to do so.  And the proceedings before and 
decisions of these official courts and tribunals are almost always public. While behind-closed-
doors government-industry bargaining still characterizes public policy-making on some issues in 
some places (this remains the norm for environmental regulation in Canada, Boyd 2003), the 
trend has been unmistakeably toward increasing public transparency, accountability and 
participation. 
 
Chapter 11 reversed this trend, going against twenty years of increased public participation, 
access to information, and access to justice in American public law, just at a time when Canadian 
governments and courts were finally taking similar steps themselves. As originally adopted, 
NAFTA envisaged that investor-state arbitrations would be conducted entirely in private.  
Arbitral decisions, and even the existence of suits, would be made public only at the discretion of 
the disputing parties.  Tribunals could appoint experts to report on relevant matters only with the 
disputing parties’ consent.  The proceedings themselves would be held in secret.  No one but the 
disputing parties and other NAFTA parties had a right to be present.  In theory, tribunals could 
accept written (but not oral) amicus curiae submissions, but this was completely alien to 
commercial arbitration practice and unheard of in the early years of Chapter 11 disputes. Chapter 
11 thus allowed disgruntled foreign investors to circumvent the transparency and accountability 
guarantees that trammeled their Canadian counterparts, and return to the good old days of one-
on-one, closed-door bargaining with government over matters of public policy, with one crucial 
difference: even the adjudication of their disputes would take place in secret instead of in open 
court. 
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The NAFTA governments finally bowed to public pressure and modified this secretive process 
in 2001 so that the existence of suits is now published, most documents are made public except 
for confidential business information, and decisions are published.62  Observers have been 
permitted to attend the rare hearing. In 2003, the NAFTA governments adopted procedures for 
the submission of amicus curiae briefs.63 But there is still no central repository of information 
and documents, there are inconsistencies among the official websites maintained by the three 
governments, and it is up to each tribunal to decide whether to allow amicus briefs.64  Despite 
these lingering problems, Chapter 11 arbitrations are more open now than NAFTA originally 
contemplated. As one Canadian environmental campaigner put it: 
 
the three NAFTA governments have accepted the public interest arguments that lawsuits 
against our governments involving large sums of public money, which also concern 
public regulations and government decisions, may not be treated the same, procedurally, 
as truly private merely commercial disputes between corporate actors.  (Swenarchuk 
2003, 5) 
 
The second casualty of NAFTA Chapter 11 was national democratic sovereignty.  The meaning 
of the quasi-constitutional rights granted to foreign investors, and the validity of local, provincial 
and federal governments’ exercises of their public authority to regulate business, are determined 
entirely outside national democratic institutions, with very limited oversight by domestic courts.  
Removing disputes from allegedly biased domestic courts and majoritarian politics was one of 
the central goals of international commercial arbitration from the start, and a long-standing 
objective of transnational capital.   
 
Unlike most international law disputes, NAFTA investors are not required to exhaust local 
remedies before bringing an international claim.  Their claims about the effects and validity of 
exercises of public legislative and regulatory authority need not be tested in the legislative, 
executive, or judicial institutions of the host country before being brought to a private arbitral 
panel for decision.  When they consider themselves to have been subject to abuse in another 
NAFTA country, they can avoid having to make their case in domestic tribunals where the 
pleadings would be more transparent and the rulings subject to appeal before superior courts.  
Furthermore, unlike others who claim mistreatment at the hands of a foreign government, 
NAFTA investors are not required to convince their home government to espouse their case.  
                                                
62 Free Trade Commission, Interpretation of Chapter 11 (31 July 2001), online: http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm 
(visited 4 January 2009). 
63 Free Trade Commission, “Statement of the Free Trade Commission on non-disputing party participation” (no 
date), online: http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm (visited 4 January 2009). 
64 For the Canadian website, see Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “Dispute Settlement: NAFTA – 
Chapter 11 – Investment,” http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-
diff/NAFTA.aspx?lang=en (visited 4 January 2009); for Mexico, see Ministry of the Economy, “Dispute 
Settlement,” http://www.economia.gob.mx/?P=5500 (visited 4 January 2009); and for the United States, see U.S. 
Department of State, “NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations,” http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm (visited 4 January 
2009). 
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They have standing to bring international claims themselves against the offending state. Since 
they need not wait for their government to initiate proceedings on their behalf, they gain the 
ability to short-circuit what may be lengthy diplomatic negotiations.   
 
Furthermore, as we discussed earlier, investment arbitration awards are insulated from review by 
domestic courts.  This may be appropriate for purely commercial disputes between private 
parties, but it is hard to see how it could be appropriate for arbitral awards deciding the legality 
of sovereign governments’ exercises of public authority to regulate business.  Yet investor-state 
arbitral awards are handled exactly the same as the arbitration of commercial disputes between 
private parties. This extraordinary deference to private transnational adjudication is not mandated 
by NAFTA itself.  The rules constraining judicial review of international arbitral awards in 
domestic courts are found in domestic commercial arbitration statutes, most of which are based 
on the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards65  or the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.66  These UN 
instruments and implementing legislation were designed for arbitration of commercial disputes, 
not disputes about the validity of sovereign exercises of public authority.  In its application for 
judicial review of the Metalclad award, Mexico argued that the courts should be less deferential 
toward Chapter 11 decisions than other foreign arbitral awards because the relationship between 
the investor and host state is regulatory, not commercial.  The judge disagreed, holding that the 
relationship is one of “investing,” and the applicable legislation defines this as a commercial 
relationship.  The court therefore applied the same highly deferential approach used in relation to 
private commercial arbitration awards.67 
 
The third casualty of NAFTA Chapter 11 was the rule of law.  In international commercial 
arbitration, there is no doctrine of precedent or stare decisis, according to which courts are bound 
by prior decisions.  This principle guarantees a minimum level of consistency and predictability 
in most legal systems. There is no such requirement in NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrations.  
Furthermore, NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes are not decided by impartial judges.  The parties each 
choose one arbitrator and the two party-appointed arbitrators choose a third arbitrator to preside 
over the panel.  While the arbitrators are independent of the parties, the parties have an obvious 
incentive to pick an arbitrator they expect to be sympathetic to their position, based on 
nationality, past decisions, published writings, or other information.  The parties pay the 
arbitrators for their services.  Unlike a tenured, independent judiciary, the arbitrators lack 
security of tenure, have a commercial interest in repeat business, and are not precluded from 
engaging in activities incompatible with impartiality.  Van Harten and Loughlin (2006, 147-148) 
summarize this disturbing situation as follows: 
 
                                                
65 10 June, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 21 U.S.T. 2517, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 26/9/Rev. 1 (1958). 
66 Adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 21 June 1985, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, 
Annex 1. 
67 Metalclad (BCSC), supra note 4.   
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Although able to determine the legality and cost of the exercise of public authority with 
limited supervision by domestic courts, arbitrators are not themselves members of a 
tenured judiciary. In most cases, arbitrators are practising lawyers or academics who 
compete for appointments in a market for adjudicative services. Unlike judges, arbitrators 
have a commercial interest to provide ‘an efficacious and economically valuable service 
for clients’, and are not barred from political or professional activities incompatible with 
their independence and impartiality. It is not uncommon for a prominent figure in 
investment arbitration simultaneously to be sitting as an arbitrator in one case, 
representing an investor or state in another, and generally advising other clients on 
investment law. Arbitrators are therefore more susceptible than judges to influence by 
concerns about their reputation and by the need to secure future business. Simply put, the 
business opportunities of arbitrators are tied to the popularity of investment arbitration: 
the greater the utility of investment arbitration to investors, the greater the number of 
claims will be filed, the greater the demand for arbitrators. Privately-appointed arbitrators 
are therefore more likely to favour the expansion of the scope and remedial power of 
investment arbitration, and will have commercial incentives to interpret the jurisdiction of 
investment tribunals expansively. No matter how well arbitrators do their job, an award 
will always be open to an apprehension of an institutional bias against the respondent 
state, given that expansive treaty interpretations and the heightened prospect of state 
liability promote investment arbitration as a commercial venture.   
 
Beyond these structural impediments to impartiality, party-appointed arbitrators may come under 
direct pressure from appointing governments or investors to rule in their favour.  One American 
appellate court judge who was appointed to a Chapter 11 tribunal reports being instructed by a US 
political official on the outcome the United States preferred in the case to protect NAFTA against 
political attack (Echeverria 2006, 984-985). As Echeverria concludes, “[f]or those of us who 
value the tradition of judicial independence, with NAFTA in place we're certainly not in Kansas 
any more, as Dorothy would say” (ibid., 985).  In short, conflicts between investors’ interests and 
public regulation are judged by private arbitrators who are dependent on the parties for repeat 
business; who face structural incentives to interpret their jurisdiction broadly; whose professional 
expertise is focused on facilitating trade and investment rather than protecting public welfare; and 
whose decisions about the legality of the exercise of public authority are insulated from 
supervision by domestic courts. 
 
 
D. UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION OF SUPRACONSTITUTIONAL BENEFITS AND BURDENS 
 
The economic supraconstitution established by international trade and investment regimes is not 
globally uniform.  It is a simultaneously domestic and international phenomenon.  It represents 
the constitutional order of a nascent supranational or post-national political formation spanning 
multiple national boundaries, but it also reconstitutionalizes every participating state, in varying 
ways and degrees, by embedding an external constitution into its domestic one (Clarkson 2004). 
Because it acts upon and is embedded in national constitutional orders, it is experienced 
differently in different nation-states.  In the North American context, the United States’ 
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supraconstitution is not the same as Canada’s or Mexico’s.  Not only does the supraconstitution 
vary from country to country, it is highly uneven across subject matters, achieving its strongest 
expression in the international trade and investment regime.  Supranational protection of the rights 
of transnational capital far exceeds that of human rights or the environment.  Supra-
constitutionalization of trade and investment norms and institutions is proceeding without a 
corresponding supra-constitutionalization of social, environmental, cultural, or labour rights and 
norms. In short, both the emerging global supraconstitution and its North American variant are 
highly asymmetrical across actors, nation states and issue areas.  They are characterized by severe 
imbalances between economic and social priorities, between the needs of capital and of people, 
between elites and masses, between hegemonic expansion and democratic self-determination, 
between the United States and its continental partners, and between the global North and South. 
These imbalances are the manifestations of a continuing, remarkably resilient and adaptive 
neoconservative project to remake the world.  For globalization to be a progressive and legitimate 
process, these imbalances must be redressed.   
 
 
E. THE SUPRACONSTITUTION’S LEGITIMATION DEFICIT 
 
The insertion of authoritative new norms into the constitutional orders of capital-importing states 
has occurred without legitimation by, or even the genuine understanding of, affected publics.  In 
the Canadian case, the imposition of constraints on the governing capacity not just of the federal, 
but also of provincial and municipal governments was the result of a negotiating process 
characterized by secrecy and non-transparency. It was achieved with a minimum of informed 
public debate.  Moreover, from NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state arbitrations to WTO Appellate 
Body rulings, these supraconstitutional norms and institutions operate largely insulated from 
domestic deliberation.  This absence of a democratic context for a major shift in the parameters 
of the political order contrasts with the extensive engagement not just by the political parties, the 
media, and interest groups – the normal actors in a political process – but also of the highest 
court of the land from 1980 to 1982 during the campaign to repatriate the domestic Canadian 
constitution.   
 
If the supraconstitution has been put in place and maintained without robust democratic 
legitimation within Canada, it goes without saying that this has also happened without 
supranational democratic legitimation.  At this point in history no supranational demos, or 
pouvoir constituant, has emerged that is capable of generating and validating Canada’s 
supraconstitution.  If, as many scholars have observed, there is no such thing as a European 
demos that can act as the source of democratic legitimacy at the European level (e.g. Weiler 
1999, 2003; De Wet 2006; Kumm 2004, 2006), there is a fortiori no such “We the People” be 
found in North America or at the global level. The only persons who can be seen as enjoying 
rights of citizenship at the North American level are investors of NAFTA member states.  Even 
if NAFTA heralded the emergence of a continental capitalist class, or WTO a global one, this 
would hardly amount to a demos capable of legitimizing an international constitution.  Not only 
does the international realm lack a pouvoir constituant, but “if such presented itself,” as 
Koskenniemi (2005: 12) observes, “it would be empire, and the constitution it would enact 
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would not be one of an international but an imperial realm”.  We would argue that this is 
precisely what has happened with the neoconservative economic supraconstitution.  The 
economic supraconstitution in which Canada and many other nations are increasingly embedded 
is the constitution of an empire which, while predominantly American in inspiration and 
location, is de-territorialized, with TNC head offices located in all capitalist countries including 
middle powers like Canada and, increasingly, developing economies such as South Korea, 
Taiwan and India.   
 
Not only does Canada’s supraconstitution lack a supraconstitutional demos, it lacks 
supranational institutions for democratic transparency and accountability that might make up for 
the lack of democratic supervision at the domestic level.  There is no North American or global 
parliament.  While there have been some moves toward transparency and participation in WTO 
dispute settlement processes, they remain less accessible and more secretive than domestic 
judicial proceedings.  International investment arbitration under NAFTA and BITs are even more 
secretive and opaque.  It is important at this juncture to observe that the absence of a 
supranational demos and of supranational institutions for democratic deliberation and oversight 
does not mean a supraconstitution cannot exist.  On the contrary, a supraconstitution can be 
created and can effectively bind national constitutions and constrain domestic governments 
without a constitutive supranational demos and without supranational mechanisms for 
democratic accountability.  The absence of these characteristics simply accentuates the 
democratic deficit at the heart of emerging supraconstitutional norms and institutions. 
 
Normative additions to the Canadian legal order from NAFTA and the WTO have consequences.  
National treatment for investment spelled the end to a whole generation of industrial 
development policies centred round the targeting of subsidies to domestic corporations or sectors 
to improve their competitive performance in order to boost their exports. It also called into 
question the capacity of the Canadian state to continue to bolster its cultural industries through 
favouring domestic entities in the private sector.  In this way, supraconstitutional norms have had 
direct impacts on the domestic legislative and administrative order without most of the public – 
and even much of the government apparatus – understanding how this had happened.   
 
 
V. Why Supraconstitutional Analysis? 
 
Critics of constitutional analysis of international law might object that all of the above points can 
be made without resorting to constitutional terminology.  They might argue that such 
terminology is at worst dangerous and at best a distraction from more important issues.  We 
disagree.   
 
Some critics of supraconstitutional analysis argue that the very language of constitutionalism may 
confer legitimacy on international regimes by presupposing democratic self-government, popular 
validation, the rule of law, and effective protection of individual human rights, the first two of 
which are completely absent and the latter two weak at the international level (e.g. Howse and 
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Nicolaides 2001; Cass 2005).  Invoking constitutional discourse “may be a rhetorical strategy 
designed to invest international law with the power and authority that domestic constitutional 
structures and norms possess” (Dunoff 2006, 649).  Critics also point to the danger that 
constitutional language will demobilize opposition to undesirable international arrangements by 
making them appear natural, inevitable or immutable – endorsing the impression that “there is no 
alternative” to their neoconservative prescriptions, a claim advocated by Margaret Thatcher 
almost thirty years ago.  To call international trade and investment rules supraconstitutional 
“might appear to establish economic globalization as an irreversible ‘fact,’ furnishing the 
convenient alibi to political and other global actors that there are no alternatives in sight” 
(Schneiderman 2008, 5).  Constitutional discourse may have the intended or unintended effect of 
suppressing ambiguity and political contestation (Dunoff 2006).   
 
Since it is still widely assumed that only the sovereign state can supply the exclusive, systematic 
and unified hierarchy of norms characteristic of a constitution, it is also thought that only within 
the boundaries of the national state can one find the single constituent power (the “We the 
People”) that a constitution presupposes and to which public authorities can be held accountable.  
As a result, to suggest the existence of a constitution at the international level strikes many not 
only as nonsensical, but dangerous, because it suggests that the democratic preconditions for 
constitution-making are present where they are not (e.g. Howse and Nicolaidis 2001).  
Furthermore, using constitutional language poses an insidious danger of conferring legitimacy on 
illegitimate actors and rules: 
 
[C]onstitutionalism is not just about the history of legitimate self-government, but 
also about the history of illegitimate domination – of cloaking illegitimate regimes 
and the illegitimate acts of sometimes legitimate regimes with the inauthentic 
robes and mystifying aura of legitimate authority. (Walker 2003, 32, emphasis in 
original). 
 
While these dangers are real, constitutional analysis does not necessarily reinforce the existing 
global status quo.  Our use of constitutional terminology and our analytical framework are offered 
in this critical mode.  We employ constitutional terminology precisely because of its power as a 
language of critique.  By characterizing certain international norms and institutions as forming 
part of the basic ensemble of practices by which contemporary societies are governed, alongside 
national constitutions, we hope to alert readers to the fundamental significance of these 
arrangements and the serious normative issues they raise.  Our intent is to challenge the choices 
embedded in NAFTA and other aspects of the institutional and normative architecture of 
neoconservative globalization, not to legitimize them.  Constitutional concepts and terminology 
provide a powerful way to do this: 
 
The discourse of constitutionalism is a powerful one and can equally rouse citizens into 
action as it can immobilize them.  It has the advantage of assessing the new terrain of 
economic globalization from a perspective different from that in which it was conceived 
and so can engage critically with the dominant discourses of [neoconservatism] ….  
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Constitutionalism, in this way, performs a double role: both as descriptor and as normative 
guide to the current scene.  (Schneiderman 2008, 5) 
 
Constitutional analysis has three advantages not offered by alternative conceptual lenses.  First, it 
enables frank and full identification of the fundamental norms and institutions by which national 
societies are governed in the contemporary era of international trade and investment 
liberalization, by putting on an equal analytical footing all of the basic rules, principles and 
procedures that constitute national legal orders without blind reference to their domestic or 
international character.  Second, it enables critical appraisal of these arrangements in light of the 
same normative expectations that most observers apply to domestic constitutions.  Contrary to 
the critics’ charges summarized above, a constitutional lens enables us to question the legitimacy 
and immutability of supranational norms by alerting ourselves to their constitutive role and 
challenging their ideological underpinnings, democratic legitimacy and uneven effects.   
 
Finally, a supraconstitutional perspective helps us to appreciate that the neoconservative project 
of the 1980s and 1990s is not dead.  It would be a mistake to assume that neoconservatism has run 
its course.  While it has suffered setbacks and undergone transformations, it has proven itself 
remarkably resilient, adapting to changing circumstances.  It has crossed partisan lines and 
influenced the policies of social democratic and other centre-left governments. When thwarted 
domestically, it has turned to the international sphere where it has enjoyed unprecedented 
successes.  It is “a shape-shifter, forever changing its name and switching identities” (Klein 2007, 
17). From its home base in the World Bank Group, it has permeated the major organs of the 
United Nations, especially those concerned with economic and social development.  Starting with 
its first unconfined field test in Pinochet’s Chile in 1973, and continuing through post-Katrina 
New Orleans in 2005, it has exploited crises as opportunities for advancement (ibid.).  The current 
global crisis is no exception.  In the midst of a resurgence of state intervention and large scale de 
facto nationalizations, the global recession is being used as cover to advance some 
neoconservative governance projects that would have made Maggie Thatcher proud.  In Canada 
and the United States, for example, governments used the crisis as an excuse to demand that the 
big automakers reduce their workers’ wages to the level of their non-unionized competitors.  The 
Canadian federal government also used the crisis as an excuse to introduce legislation dismantling 
environmental impact assessment regulations, while the Ontario government mooted a proposal to 
eliminate two regulations for every new one introduced – a deregulatory agenda that would make 
Ontario premier Mike Harris’s neoconservative Red Tape Reduction program of the mid-1990s 
seem modest.   
 
George W. Bush’s neoconservatism was not his father’s.  It differed in important respects, 
including its proselytizing right-wing Christian zeal and breathtaking disregard for international 
law and human rights.  In any case the most recent Bush administration has been replaced and 
important aspects of its political doctrine repudiated.  Even before the change of administration, 
there were some positive changes at the margins of the international trade and investment regime.  
The American Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 200268 required that new trade 
                                                
68 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §3801 (2002). 
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agreements not give foreign investors more substantive rights with respect to investment 
protections than American investors in the US.  Ironically, this is a modest version of the Calvo 
Clause that American multinationals and governments had fought for decades to remove in Latin 
America. This legislation resulted in a change to the wording of some new American investment 
treaties.  Canada made a similar change in its own bilateral investment treaty (BIT) negotiations.  
The 2006 Canada-Peru BIT is typical of the new language:   
 
Except in rare circumstances, such as when a measure or series of measures is so severe in 
the light of its purpose that it cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted and 
applied in good faith, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and 
applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the 
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.69  
 
Some commentators have called for a similar amendment to NAFTA Chapter 11.  Given 
President Obama’s campaign statements, there may indeed be an appetite to reopen the 
continental trade and investment rule book.  But simply inserting interpretive guidance on the 
meaning of expropriation would not change NAFTA’s general thrust or its supraconstitutional 
effect.  Nothing short of a fundamental renegotiation of the nascent continental governance 
regime would do the job, and there is no indication that this is in the offing. 
 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have argued that a supraconstitutional analysis provides a useful lens for making 
sense of the international investment regime and exposes several reasons to be concerned about 
this regime.  The same analysis can be applied to international law and organizations generally, 
helping to make sense of some of the contemporary transformations of law and governance 
associated with globalization, especially the massive proliferation of international agreements 
and institutions having an influence over the daily lives of individuals, firms and governments.  
The paper focuses on NAFTA and BITs because in our view they present the strongest case for 
supraconstitutionalization outside the European Union.  If the argument for the existence of a 
nascent global supraconsitution is not convincing in this context, it is unlikely to convince in 
others.  If it does convince, then our attention should turn to what we can do to begin to right the 
perilous imbalance reflected in and perpetuated by contemporary supraconstitutional 
arrangements, a question that is beyond the scope of this paper.70 
                                                
69 Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (2006), 
Annex B.13(1), online: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/fipa_list.aspx?lang=en (visited 8 April 2009).  Similar 
provisions are found in the current American and Canadian model BITs, which are used as the basis for new 
negotiations. 
70 See Clarkson & Wood 2009. 
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